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Who can argue that older people staying active, engaged, and pro 
ductively working is a bad thing? Brookings Institution's Gary Burt- 
less and Boston College economist Joseph Quinn want older people to 
work more. They show that the institutional rules of Social Security, 
social norms, economic prosperity, and employer pension and health 
plans affect retirement behavior, and they offer changes in tax laws and 
pension rules that would "incent" more older people to work. Yet, 
there is considerable disagreement over how much choice people 
should have between working or not after a certain age.
There is a lot right about Burtless and Quinn's study. It is a compi 
lation of these experts' empirical findings on retirement and work and 
the detailed interactions of the Social Security's complex delayed 
requirement credits and earnings test. They sweep over a century of 
behavior lucidly in order to build the case for specific and easy-to- 
understand changes in the Social Security system and tax laws. There 
are, however, serious weaknesses that ultimately make their case for 
raising the retirement age in Social Security their major policy pre 
scription fail. The paper ignores the important differences between 
the longevity of whites and blacks, the employ ability of older women 
compared with that of men, and the relative importance of Social Secu 
rity benefits for married couples versus single women. Their proposals 
benefit employers as a group and the highest-earning professionals. 
The benefits of increasing the retirement age (thus cutting benefits) are 
not tremendous; Quinn and Burtless admit that increasing longevity is 
not the major reason for the Social Security system's projected short 
fall (their note 18). Moreover, the benefits of maintaining the system 
are large. Workers will pay higher taxes to keep the retirement age 
from increasing.
Joseph Quinn and Gary Burtless describe how older people in the 
United States have connected themselves to their work over the last 
century. Men are retiring at younger ages except during the last 
decade. Women are increasing their paid work at all ages. Allowing a
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paragraph's worth of celebration of the working class's achieving some 
leisure at the end of their working lives due to increasing wealth, the 
paper's main focus is to structure policies so that the elderly workers 
work longer.
The protagonist in the paper is the "U.S. taxpayer" and the burden 
on this central player is the "burden imposed by an aging population," 
which could be lessened if workers "could be persuaded to delay their 
retirements and continue contributing to the health and pension sys 
tems." If people are to be persuaded to work longer, then the paper 
rightly identifies reasons about why people and by that they mean 
mostly men have been persuaded to retire earlier (except in the most 
recent decade). One theory is that workers have poor health; a second 
is that older workers face labor market discrimination; and a third is 
that workers want to retire and can increasingly afford it.
The authors reject the first theory by asserting the physical jobs 
requiring youngish bodies are on the decline, and that, on average, peo 
ple live longer. Let us look closely at this bit of received wisdom: first, 
at the cost of this longevity and, second, at the extent and distribution 
of it. Figure 1 shows that increased longevity and work ability of the 
elderly is overblown. The top line shows that life expectancy for a 65- 
year-old male has increased only a few years since 1950 age 78 to 
age 81 an increase, but not a dramatic one. What is dramatic, as 
Burtless and Quinn also emphasize, is that male labor force participa 
tion rates are falling. This is a clear demonstration of how workers 
have chosen to spend the increases in the nation's productive capacity. 
The "gap" between work and death also represents a long hard fight for 
victory that workers pay for from employers and the state.
Averages hide crucial differences. Unlike whites, African-Ameri 
can males are not enjoying significant increases in longevity. Since 
five years ago, white males at age 65 live 2.6 percent longer almost 
two years while an African-American male's expectation went up 
seven months. Even worse is that the lower expected longevity of an 
African-American male entering the work force at age 20 in 1994 
means that on average he'll retire for less than two months at full bene 
fits. Robert Ball warns us that the Social Security system cannot right 
work and social injustices, but raising the normal retirement age has 
profound differential effects by race (Table 1).
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Figure 1 Workers Won Retirement: The Gap between Death and Work, 
1950-1994
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SOURCE: Steurele and Bakija (1994).
In addition to the variation in longevity among groups, it seems 
that the desire to work past 65 is concentrated in a few select groups. 
Only 4 percent of the elderly in the lowest income quintile have earn 
ings, whereas almost 40 percent in the top have earnings (EBRI1995). 
This corroborates other evidence that higher-income professionals are 
most likely to voluntarily work past normal retirement age (Bovbjerg 
1998).
Quinn and Burtless acknowledge, and I agree, that people with 
jobs requiring stamina and brawn should get early retirement through 
the disability insurance system; this is an administrative change and 
helps those too old to work but not entirely disabled to retire. This pro 
posal increases costs.
The authors argue that retirement became more acceptable as it 
became more affordable, and that social norms alone affect behavior
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Table 1 Longevity by Race and Sex, 1979-1980 and 1995
in 1979-1980 in 1994 Increase in longevity 
Race/sex (yr.) (yr) in 15 years (%)
Expected age at death for 
those at age 20
White male 72.5 74.4 2.6
White female 79.4 80.4 1.3
Black male 66.4 67.1 1.1
Black female 74.9 75.5 0.8
Expected age at death for 
those at age 65
White male 79.3 80.6 1.6 
White female 83.6 84.1 0.6 
Black male 78.3 78.6 0.4 
Black female 82.1 82.2 01 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce 1997.
(controlling for all the other factors). In support of the social approba 
tion hypothesis, they suggest that that ADEA of 1978 that gradually 
eliminated most mandatory retirement ages may have encouraged the 
recent increases in work among the elderly by reducing age discrimina 
tion and sending a signal to older Americans that work was socially 
acceptable.
The fact that the social signal affects some groups—like white, 
upper-income professionals—more than others is not a factor in their 
analysis. Most workers do not want to retire later and they are willing 
to pay for it. Most importantly, "encouraging" working more by low 
ering pensions has high costs paid by some and benefits reaped by oth 
ers.
To this point, I am reminded of a conversation I overheard in 1997 
between the former President of the Bricklayers and Allied Craftwork- 
ers Union, John Joyce, and Estelle James, lead author of the World 
Bank's 1994 pension study, which had a theme similar to that of Burt- 
less and Quinn. She complained about his remarks given in a speech as 
misinterpreting the World Bank's support for advance funding and par 
tially privatizing the world's pay-as-you-go retirement systems. Our
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argument is complicated, she protested. Such policies would protect 
the old and promote economic growth.
He turned, facing her directly and said, "Don't you want workers 
to work longer?"
"Yes," she said, "That's part of it."
The union president replied, "Then you are taking something away 
and giving nothing back."
I recall the conversation to make meaningful two observations that 
Burtless and Quinn acknowledge in their otherwise unambiguous call 
for older retirement ages. First, they argue that it may desirable to raise 
the retirement age but U.S. workers don't want to work longer. (They 
show us that older Americans work longer than most workers in OECD 
nations.) Eighteen polls over a 20-year period ending in 1997 showed 
that Americans oppose raising the retirement age. Burtless and Quinn 
imply that people may be responding to the survey this way because 
they want to retire even earlier, before age 55. However, Burtless and 
Quinn concede that workers may understand the cost of what they 
want; they cite a recent EBRI poll that showed that, by a 2:1 majority, 
"workers favor higher payroll taxes over reduced Social Security pen 
sions."
Indeed, when given a chance, Americans are willing to pay for 
what they want. Union demands reflect the preferences of the average 
worker rather than the marginal or last worker hired in nonunion set 
tings (Freeman 1981). The preferences of union and nonunion workers 
between pensions and wages are startling. According the Employment 
Cost Index in the 10-year period between 1980 and 1990, union work 
ers had negative real wage increases but positive two-digit increases in 
pension contributions. Nonunion workers had the opposite experience: 
real wages increased by a bit, but pension costs plummeted. There are 
many factors—age of the workforce and industries—that can explain a 
huge difference in compensation patterns, but the simplest is consistent 
with other evidence. When asked, as they are when they vote for a col 
lectively bargained contract, workers are ready to pay for their end of 
career leisure with reduced wages (Ghilarducci 1997). In other ways, 
U.S. workers have also demonstrated they will pay to retire. Payroll 
taxes increased by 16 percent in 1983 when Congress endorsed many 
of the recommendations of the Greenspan Commission.
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Quinn and Burtless also acknowledge that households are also pay 
ing for retirement by increasing hours of work when they are younger. 
The average hours of work by the U.S. population has increased signif 
icantly since 1968. Workers between 25-54, on average, work 14 per 
cent more hours than they did 30 years ago, because more women took 
jobs.
Quinn and Burtless have six proposals.
1) Raise the age at which full Social Security benefits can be 
received to age 67 (or an age that is increased according to 
increases in average longevity). This lowers benefits.
2) Exempt older workers from payroll taxes. This, of course, 
strains the Social Security program.
3) Make employers prorate fringe benefits for part time workers so 
that firms will more likely hire older workers for more than 35 
hours if the cost of hiring them for less increases. This will raise 
the cost to employers.
4) Make Medicare the first insurance payer. This will raise Medi 
care costs but might reduce the employers' costs for older work 
ers.
5) Raise the EITC for older workers. This is paid for by general 
revenue.
6) Repeal the earnings test so that workers receive full Social Secu 
rity benefits regardless of earnings. This helps those earning 
over $17,000 per year.
Who wins and who loses?
• Employers win in three ways from Burtless and Quinn's propos 
als. First, there are significant wage subsidies for employers hir 
ing older workers inherent in expanding the EITC, repealing the 
earnings test, making Medicare the first payer, and lowering pay 
roll taxes. These reduce wage costs. Second, increasing the sup 
ply of workers reduces the bargaining power of all workers and 
puts downward pressure on wages. Third, higher-income work 
ers would pay for an expanded EITC through general revenues 
generated by the progressive federal tax system. Proposal three,
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however, requiring employers to partly pay for the fringe benefits 
of part time workers, may increase costs if employers don't 
switch part-time workers to temporary status.
• Higher-income older workers win. Workers who would have 
worked longer anyway—white-collar professionals—are reward 
ed by getting a larger delayed retirement credit and by the elimi 
nation of the earnings test. Higher-income workers also benefit 
more than lower-income workers do because they are unlikely to 
retire at the earlier ages and take the lower pension.
• Middle-class workers lose. Instead of raising the retirement age, 
the Social Security system can raise payroll taxes. Lower-income 
workers—those in the first two quintiles—are almost fully subsi 
dized by the EITC. So middle-income workers would have to 
pay the bulk of this increased cost if the earnings cap is not 
expanded. However, since these workers are more likely to retire 
at age 65 or earlier, then they pay for their retirement and "get 
something back" from their taxes.
• Blue-collar workers, workers in stressful jobs, and jobs sensitive 
to the business cycle will lose when the normal retirement age 
increases because they are much more likely to leave at the earlier 
ages and accept a lower pension.
• Older women lose. Women who do not work longer, and conse 
quently receive a lower pension, will have lower earnings. This 
group is already at greater risk of poverty; the poverty rate for 
older single women is 22 percent, compared with 4 percent for 
older couples (who are more likely to get income from earnings). 
The wage gap between older men and women is also higher, sug 
gesting that work opportunities for older women are more limited 
than for older men.
• Workers of all ages lose. If older workers have to work two to 
three years longer to get full benefits, then the increased supply of 
older workers searching for jobs depresses bargaining power and 
wages.
The gap between death and retirement shows a potential labor 
force ready to work if other sources of income—like Social Security 
and pensions—are made less certain and generous. In the year 2000,
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approximately 4.2 million Americans over the age of 65 are expected 
to be in the labor force. If the labor force participation rates rise to the 
1950s level because of smaller Social Security benefits, the number 
jobs created would have to triple or unemployment will soar, which in 
turn will suppress wages. Burtless and Quinn assure us that the "job- 
creating capacity" of the American economy will accommodate this 
increase supply of workers. They credit the "flexible" U.S. labor mar 
ket's ability to absorb workers. They acknowledge that "if older work 
ers were forced to wait for two or three extra years for full Social 
Security retirement benefits to begin," many would work longer in their 
jobs or spend more time looking for work. This would "certainly 
depress the wages of aged job seekers."
British Philosopher Bertrand Russell helps us step back from the 
costs and benefits of reducing pensions and encouraging older people 
to work by commenting on the urge behind the urge. He writes in the 
1935 essay In Praise of Idleness (p. 17),
The idea that the poor should have leisure has always been shock 
ing to the rich . . . When I was a child, shortly after urban working 
men had acquired the vote a number of public holidays were 
established. I remember hearing an old Duchess say, "What do 
the poor want with holidays? They ought to work.
In sum, this paper does not make the case for increasing the retire 
ment age; the current projected numbers of retirees can be paid for 
through a modest increase in the payroll tax, which by all evidence 
seems to be acceptable to the American public. Moreover, the cost 
incidence of raising the retirement age would benefit high-income pro 
fessional workers and employers at the expense of middle-income and 
women workers. Given the persistent problem of growing income ine 
quality, any proposal that increases the gap between the top and bottom 
is unadvisable.
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